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Abstract
In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment net-
works, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of beneﬁts to
consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of mar-
ket structures: duopolisticcompetition and cartel, symmetric and asymmet-
ric networks, and alternative assumptions about multihomingand consumer
preferences. We ﬁnd that competition unambiguously increases consumer
and merchant welfare. We extend this analysis to competition among pay-
ment networks providing different payment instruments and ﬁnd similar re-
sults.
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Two-sided markets are deﬁned as a platform(s) providing goods and services to
two distinct end-users where the platform attempts to set the price for each type
of end-user to “get both sides on board” because the beneﬁts of one type of
end-user increases as the participation of the other type of end-user increases.
Armstrong (2002), Evans (2003), and Rochet and Tirole (2003) suggest various
examples oftwo-sidedmarketssuch as yellowpages (advertisersand users), adobe
acrobat (creators of documents and readers), and television networks (viewers and
advertisers). In this paper, we study an example of a two-sided market–payment
networks (consumer and merchants).
Recently, antitrust authorities and courts in several jurisdictions have investi-
gated the business practices of payment networks. In the United States, the Gov-
ernment sued MasterCard and Visa alleging anticompetitive business practices.
The court ruled that MasterCard and Visa must allow ﬁnancial institutions to is-
sue competitor network credit cards such as American Express and Discover (see
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (2001)). In another U.S. case that was settled
out of court, around 5 million U.S. merchants sued the two card associations al-
leging an illegal tying of the associations ofﬂine debit cards and credit cards. The
card associations agreed to unbundle their ofﬂine debit card branded product from
their credit card branded product. In Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia
set rules for the determination of interchange fees, removed no-surcharge restric-
tions, and reduced barriers for entry to the market for credit card services (see
Reserve Bank of Australia (2002)). The authorities in the European Commission
and the United Kingdom have also investigated the business practices of the card
associations (see European Commission (2002) and Cruickshank (2000)). These
investigations has led to the development of several theoretical models to study
pricing of payment services.
In this paper, we study the pricing strategies of payment networks that maxi-
mize the joint proﬁts earned from both types of end-users. Recent investigations
of these markets have focused on the determination of various prices including in-
terchange fees, merchant discounts, and retail prices of goods and services within
a single payment platform (see Chakravorti and Emmons (2003), Chakravorti and
To (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002), Schmalensee (2002), Schwartz and Vincent
(2002), Wright (2003) and Wright (2004)).1 Often policy discussions have fo-
cused on whether each participant is paying her fair share of the underlying cost
1For summary of these papers and others, see Chakravorti (2003).
1of the payment service.
Recently, Guthrie and Wright (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) have in-
vestigated pricing decisions by payment networks when there are competing pay-
ment platforms. We build upon these two models by considering joint distribu-
tions for consumer and merchant beneﬁts from participating on each network. In
other words, each consumer and merchant is assigned a network-speciﬁcl evel
of beneﬁt from participating on each network. Consumers and merchants base
their payment network usage decision on the difference between their individual
network-speciﬁc beneﬁt and that network’s participation fee. Our model also dif-
fers because we consider the effects of competition on price level and price struc-
ture. Unlike Guthrie and Wright, we consider ﬁxed fees instead of per-transaction
fees for consumers.2 We focus on the case where consumers choose to participate
in only one payment network, often referred to in the literature as singlehoming,
and merchants that are able to accept payment products from both networks, of-
ten referred to as multihoming. We consider three types of market structures for
payment networks: cartel, non-cooperativeduopoly under product differentiation,
and Bertrand duopoly (price competition for homogeneous products). We ﬁnd
that competition unambiguously improves consumer and merchant welfare while
reducingthe proﬁtsof paymentnetworks. Competitionalso affectsthe pricestruc-
ture. However, at a given price level, the price structure in a competitive duopoly
may not be welfare-efﬁcient.
2 Literature Review
While the literature on network effects is well established (see Farrell and Sa-
loner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985)), this literature ignores how to price
services for two different sets of consumers where each set of consumer bene-
ﬁts from an increased level of participation by the other. Recently, several pa-
pers have investigated price structures in two-sided markets with network effects.
Armstrong (2002), Caillaud and Jullien (2001), Jullien (2001), Rochet and Tirole
(2003), and Schiff (2003) explore platform competition for various industries. A
major contribution of this literature is that different types of consumers may not
share equallyinthe costs ofprovidingthe goodorservice. Insome cases, one-type
of end-user may be subsidized. Many of the results depend on the accessibility of
2Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider ﬁxed fees as an extension of their model but restrict one
side of the market to singlehome.
2different types of consumers to different platforms, the underlying fee structure,
and their demands for services from a speciﬁc platform.
An example of a two-sided market with network effects is the market for pay-
ment services. Rochet and Tirole (2004) state that a necessary condition for two-
sided markets is the failure of Coase theorem. A key observation in the market for
payment services is that the law of one price generally prevails. In other words,
merchants are reluctant to charge different prices based on the underlying cost of
each payment instrument.3 The charging of one-price implies that there is not
complete pass-through of the cost of payment instruments. However, Rochet and
Tirole argue that the failure of Coase theorem is not sufﬁcient for a market to be
two-sided. They state that for a given price level, if the price structure affects the
total volume of transactions on the platform, the market is said to be two-sided.
Several models have shown that the interchange fee is not neutral under one-price
policiesand imperfectgoods markets(Frankel (1998)and Gans and King (2003)).
Most of the payment network literature has only considered a single payment
platform. Baxter (1983) models a four-party open network consisting of con-
sumers, merchants, and their respective banks.4 Payment providers charge con-
sumers and merchants usage fees. The merchant’s payment provider usually pays
an interchange fee to the consumer’s payment provider. He ﬁnds that to balance
the demands for payment services by consumers and merchants, an interchange
fee may be required to compensate the ﬁnancial institution that serves the group
that beneﬁts less and/or faces higher costs to bring that group on board. Rochet
and Tirole (2002), Wright (2003), and Wright (2004) expand on Baxter by con-
sidering the effects of strategic interactions among payment system participants
on the determination of the interchange fee.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider platform competition generally and inves-
tigate some characteristics of payment markets. First, they provide a general
framework to model platform competition that is applicable to various markets.
Second, they are able to characterize the determinants of price allocation between
end-users. There maybe instances whereone end-user subsidizes the other. Third,
3There is a long legal and regulatory history in the United States concerning the
charging of different prices depending on the type of payment instrument used (see
Chakravorti and Shah (2003)). Even in countries, where merchants face no restrictions to im-
pose different prices, few merchants choose to do so (see IMA Market Development AB (2000)
and Vis and Toth (2000)).
4There are also closed or proprietarynetworks where one entityserves all consumers and mer-
chants that are members and operates the network. Examples of such networks include American
Express and Discover in the United States.
3they ﬁnd that the seller’s price (could be viewed as the merchant discount in the
payment services context) increases with captive buyers (buyers could be viewed
as consumers in the payments context) and decreases when there are marquee
buyers under certain conditions. Similarly, the buyer’s price moves in the oppo-
site direction. Captive buyers prefer to use a certain platform and marquee buyers
are coveted by sellers.
Guthrie and Wright (2003) also model competing payment networks where
merchants use card acceptance as a strategic tool. They assume per-transaction
costs for both consumers and merchants and each network’s beneﬁti sidentical to
their competitors. Their main result is that when consumers hold only one card,
competition between payment networks does not result in a lower interchange fee.
However, if some consumers are able to hold more than one card, equilibrium in-
terchange fees are lower if merchants are monopolists. If merchants compete for
customers, merchants are willing to pay higher interchange fees potentially eras-
ing any reduction in interchange fees.
Schiff (2003) explores platform competition in a Cournot duopoly, focusing
on the effects of beneﬁt asymmetry, for the two sides, on the market equilib-
ria. He ﬁnds that multiple equilibria may occur for some parameter values. He
also considers the possibility of having “open systems,” where subscribing to a
network gives access to all agents on the other side of the market (independent of
their network afﬁliations). In his framework,competing platforms have incentives
to make their systems open.5
Our model differs from the existing literature in several ways. First, we fo-
cus on competing payment networks that offer payment instruments that have
independent beneﬁts and costs for consumers and merchants. In other models,
consumers and merchants are indifferent between the beneﬁts of each network.
As a result, we are able to compare differences in consumer and merchant pref-
erences to each network’s products. For example, certain consumers may prefer
to pay with one network’s debit card while others may prefer to pay with another
network’s debit card.6 Consumers may prefer one network’s product over an-
other’s based on the types of services offered or the status of being a member. We
also consider competition among different types payment instruments offered by
differentnetworks. Consumers notonly choose amongnetworksfor a type ofpay-
5This is equivalent to a special access regime (peering) used, especially, on the Internet. The
economics of peering access is investigated in Little and Wright (2000), and Roson (2003).
6In the United States, there are two types of debit card networks–signature-based cards that
use credit card networks to process transactions and PIN-based cards that use the ATM networks
to process transactions. These types of transactions have different pricing structures.
4ment instrument, but also choose among different types of payment instruments.
We consider this case as an extension of our model.
Second, we consider the effects of competition on price level and price struc-
ture. Rochet and Tirole (2003) assume a small ﬁxed level of proﬁts for both
issuing and acquiring sides in a non-proﬁt joint-venture network. In reality, in
both credit card and debit card markets, for-proﬁt and non-proﬁt networks co-
exist. They consider welfare effects of changes in the price structure at a given
price level. Similarly, Guthrie and Wright (2003) consider only welfare effects of
changes in price structure and not of changes in the price level. In most of the
model variants presented in these papers, networks maximize proﬁts by maximiz-
ing the volume of transactions. This is important because, in many circumstances,
social welfare maximization also implies maximizing the volume of transactions.
In our model, maximizing proﬁts is not generally the same as maximizing the
volume of transactions, meaning that market prices are not necessarily welfare
optimal.
Third, in our model, each network serves as both issuer and acquirer. There-
fore, we do not explicitly model the interchange fee. However, we can implicitly
consider interchange fees if there are differences in the demands of both types
of end-users for the payment services and/or differences in costs to provide these
services to the distinct type of end-users.
Fourth, in our model, consumers pay ﬁxed membership fees and merchants
pay per transaction fees. The introduction of ﬁxed fees may restrict consumers
from multihoming. We will explore the effects of this assumption below.
3 The Model
We construct a one-period model of payment network competition with three
types of agents. There are two payment network operators. There are a large
number of consumers (C) and a large number of merchants (M). Consumers
demand one unit of each good and purchase goods from each merchant.
To focus on the choice of payment instrument, consumers and merchants de-
rive utility based on the type of payment instrument used. There are three pay-
ment instruments. Cash is the default payment instrument available to all con-
sumers and merchants at zero cost yielding zero utility for both consumers and
merchants.7 There are two payment networks each offering a payment product
that is associated with positive beneﬁts for most consumers and merchants. These
7In reality, the cost of cash transactions is not zero and the utilityof using cash is not zero. The
5networks may offer similar products such as different types of credit cards or of-
fer different types of instruments such as credit and debit cards. Each network
provides services to both consumers and merchants directly and must recover the
total cost of providing these services.
The total beneﬁts, obtained by a consumer from being a member of a network,
is given by a per-transaction beneﬁt, hc
i, multiplied by the number of merchants
accepting the payment product, Dm
i .F or each consumer, per-transaction beneﬁts,
hc
i, are independently distributed via a cumulative distribution with support [0,τi],
where i ∈{ 1,2} is an index referring to the speciﬁc payment network. Consumer
beneﬁts may include convenience, extension of short-term and long-term credit,
security, and status.
Unlike Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Guthrie and Wright (2003), we consider
network beneﬁts that are platform-speciﬁc. This is a key difference in our model.
We motivate this difference by observing that different card networks provide dif-
ferent beneﬁts to different consumers. For example, charge cards, instruments
where consumers are not allowed to revolve balances, coexist with credit cards,
instruments where consumers are allowed to revolve. The pricing structures differ
between these two instruments as well. Charge cards such as American Ex-
press cards have traditionally charged higher fees than Visa and MasterCard cards
where issuers earn revenue from ﬁnance charges to revolvers. Another example
is the coexistence of signature-based and PIN-based debit cards where there are
different price structures between these products. In our model, we allow some
consumers to have strong preferences for a given network’s product and allow
other consumers to have weaker preferences so that price structures may affect
usage decisions.
Consumers pay an annual fee, fc
i ,t oaccess the payment system, allowing
them to make an unlimited number of payments.8 While most U.S. issuers do
not impose annual fees, some credit and debit card issuers that offer additional
enhancements such as frequent-use awards impose annual fees. Generally, most
European issuers impose annual fees.
We assume fc
i is sufﬁciently high such that each consumer holds only one
card.9 Utility from card holding is given by the difference between total bene-
key assumptions here are that cash transactions cost less than any other type of transaction and
that the utilityfrom using cash is less than that of using other payment instruments.
8Guthrie and Wright (2003) do not consider ﬁxed fees. Rochet and Tirole (2003) consider
ﬁxed fees as a special case of their model. The introduction of ﬁxed fees does not allow for the
consideration of multihomingconsumers and merchants in an easily tractable model.
9Given the marginal cost for card usage is zero and the marginal beneﬁti spositive, consumers
6ﬁts from all transactions and the fee. Therefore, the total beneﬁtt oconsumers
increases as merchant acceptance increases. Once a consumer becomes a mem-
ber of a payment network, we assume the consumer uses that network’s payment
product exclusively with merchants that accept it. In other words, non-cash pur-
chases dominate cash purchases for those consumers that are members of a pay-
ment network.
Each merchant is a monopolist selling an unique good.10 Merchant beneﬁts
could include security, convenience, and status. Merchants pay a per-transaction
fee for each transaction, fm
i ,b ut cannot set different prices based on the payment
instrument used.11 A payment type will be accepted whenever the per-transaction
beneﬁt hm
i (which is drawn randomly from a cumulative distribution function
F m
i , with support [0,µ i])e xceeds the per-transaction fee. Note that: (1) accep-
tance choices are independent, and (2) acceptance does not depend on the number
of consumers that are members of that payment network whereas a consumer’s
choice depends on the number of merchants accepting the payment card.12 There
are three types of merchants. Those that accept neither of the payment network’s
products because the beneﬁt from accepting them is lower than the fee charged.
Other merchants will only accept one of the payment network’s products because
while the net beneﬁto fone network is positive, the other is negative. Finally,
some merchants will accept both non-cash payment products because there are
positive beneﬁts from doing so.
To sum up, utility for the representative consumer, U c, and merchant, Um, can
be expressed as:
U



























willprefer to use this instrumentfor all transactions. Similararguments have been made for check
usage in the United States, see Chakravorti and McHugh (2002).
10Note that by construction, we ignore business stealing effects. Other models, such as
Guthrie and Wright (2003), have shownthat business stealing incentives may allow networkoper-
ators to charge higher fees to merchants.
11Pricingrestrictionson merchants may take various forms. Non-discriminationpricingpolices
prohibit merchants from setting different prices based on the payment instrument used. In the
United States, merchants are allowed to extend discounts for purchases made with non-credit
card payment forms. However, card association rules usually prohibit surcharges for credit card
purchases in most jurisdictions.
12Clearly, ifmerchants are restrictedtochoosingonlyonepayment network,thenumber ofcon-
sumers that are members of a payment network would affect the merchants’ choice of networks.
7where Dc
i is the number of consumers holding network i’s instrument and Dm
i is
the number of merchants accepting network i’s product.13
Payment networks face two kinds of costs: a consumer ﬁxed cost, gi, and a












Networks choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively the consumer and mer-
chant fees, taking the other network choices as given (a Nash equilibrium). Tim-
ing is as follows:
• Consumer and merchant beneﬁts are randomly drawn;
• Networks maximize proﬁts, by choosing fc
i and fm
i ;
• Merchants decide which payment forms to accept;
• Consumers decide which payment option to purchase;
• Transactions are realized.
The number of accepting merchants is determined, on the basis of the distri-









Note that merchants accept non-cash payment alternatives as long as their beneﬁts
from doing so are greater than their costs. Because merchants only face per-
transaction fees, they need only have one consumer using the network’s product
to accept it as long as the beneﬁti sgreater than the cost.
The consumer side of the market is more complicated. To be chosen, a card
has to pass two tests: (1) consumers must derive positive utility, and (2) the utility
derived from this payment form must be higher than the other payment form. The
market shares can be identiﬁed as in ﬁgure 1, where each consumer is mapped




j ) express total potential beneﬁts from
using card i or j.
In ﬁgure 1, the large rectangle is divided into six parts. Consumers falling
inside the smaller rectangle in the bottom left do not join either payment network,
13Because we assume that consumers singlehome and always prefer to use non-cash payment
alternatives, we equate membership in a payment network with usage of its product when mer-
chants accept the payment product.
8Figure 1: Network’s share of consumers
9as their beneﬁts are smaller than the membership fees of either network. Other
consumers become members of either payment network i if in rectangle B or
payment network j if in rectangle A. When both networks are associated with
positive utility, consumers choose on the basis of relative utility, and the border
between the two market areas is given by the 45 degree segment that splits the
square into triangles C and D. Consumers in area E also choose a network on
the basis of relative utility, but their choice is primarily determined by the number
of accepting merchants. For this reason, only the network offering the highest
consumer surplus (τDm − fc) attracts consumers in an area like E, which is
absent if networks are symmetric and apply equal prices to both consumers and
merchants.
Assuming uniform and independent random variables for consumer beneﬁts
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When choosing the consumer and merchant fees, fc
i and fm
i , each payment net-
work maximizes proﬁts, given by equation 3. It may be shown that optimal fees
obey the following principle:
Proposition 1 Proﬁt maximizing fees can be determined on the basis of a “mod-
10iﬁed Lerner rule” that is:14
p
c + f




 m +  cm −  m c (7)
where pc =
fc−g
























Proof. Following Rochet and Tirole (2003), substitute into equation 3, and con-
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i +l o gD
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i (8)
Assuming log-concavity, equation 7 is obtained from simple manipulations of










Proposition 1 highlights that the problem of setting optimal fees can be de-
composed in two parts: the choice of the global price level pc
i + fm
i , and the
problem of balancing the relative prices pc
i/fm
i .
When demand functions are expressed as in equations 4, 5, and 6, the distribu-
tion of merchant beneﬁts is uniform in the interval [0,µ], and markets have both
unitary mass, network elasticities are:
14Thisresultis an adaptationofa ﬁndingobtainedbyRochet and Tirole (2003), whoderive ﬁrst
order general conditions for proﬁt maximization in a two-sided market. In deriving these condi-
tions, however, they ignore the effect of a variation in network size on the price level. Equation
7 translates the result of Rochet and Tirole for our case, while taking into account the effect of





































The Effects of Competition on Prices and Welfare
To see how competition affects the market equilibrium, we now consider two
cases: a duopoly, where each network maximizes its proﬁts, assuming the com-
petitor’s fees as given, and a monopoly, where an hypothetical cartel maximizes
the sum of the two networks’ proﬁts. The difference between the two cases is
given by the fact that a monopolist internalizes any pecuniary externality, that is,
any effect of a price change in the other operator’s proﬁt. In other words, the
cartel maximizes the sum of the two proﬁt functions, as deﬁned in equation 3.
Furthermore, as the following proposition states, pecuniary externalities have an
unambiguous effect on the price level and welfare.
Proposition 2 In the market for payment services deﬁned above, the sum of con-
sumer and merchant prices in duopoly are always lower than in monopoly, so
that competition is always welfare enhancing for both consumers and merchants.
Indeed, lower merchant fees increase merchant welfare and, indirectly, consumer
welfare because of the higher number of accepting merchants. Lower consumer
fees increase consumer welfare and, indirectly, merchant welfare because of the
higher number of consumers in a network.
Proof. Since the number of of subscribing merchants is unaffected by the other






























































12where the sign of both relationships is obtained from the deﬁnitions of utility 1
and 2.
An increase in both merchant and consumer fees applied by the competitor
network expands the consumer demand. Consequently, the proﬁto fanetwork
increases if the competitor raises its prices. This is the conventional pecuniary
externality due to competition. The perceived price elasticity of a competitive
network will always be larger than that of a monopolistic cartel, and competition
unambiguously reduces both merchant and consumer fees. 
In the model with uniform and independent distributions for consumer and
merchant beneﬁts, cross price derivatives (and elasticities) are, in general, discon-

















































µjCM >0 w = mj − fc
j
Proposition 2 has a simple intuitive explanation. A two-sided network has
two instruments to attract more consumers: the prices applied to consumers and
merchants. Both instruments, however, work to the same direction, expanding
one network and reducing the competitor’s one. Despite the existence of two
price instruments, pecuniary externalities work in the standard way.
This ﬁnding, intuitive as it may seem, is actually in sharp contrast with most
recent literature on competition in credit card networks (e.g., Rochet and Tirole
(2002), Guthrie and Wright (2003)), where it is shown that competition may be
harmful for consumers and merchants. The key difference between our approach
and the previous literature is that the latter is based on the (sometimes implicit)
assumption of constant proﬁts of the ﬁnancial institutions of consumers and mer-
chants and an often zero proﬁt condition for the network itself.
13If proﬁts are constant for member banks, the main effect of competition is
altering the price balance on the two market sides. However, as we show in the
appendix, the equilibrium price structure is not generally welfare-efﬁcientneither
in competition nor in monopoly. In both cases, it would be possible to achieve
higheraggregate welfarelevels by reducing theprice on one side, while increasing
the price on the other side, so as to keep global network proﬁts unchanged. The
move frommonopolytocompetitiveduopolymaynothelpin thissense. However,
if proﬁts are unconstrained, the overall price reduction dominates the effects on
the price structure and welfare unambiguously improve for both sides.
It should be stressed that we retain the existence of two alternative platforms,
eveni nthe monopolistic setting. On the contrary, Schiff (2003) considers a mo-
nopoly with a single platform, ﬁnding that welfare may improve when switching
from duopolistic competition to monopoly. Prices actually increase, but a single
standard is imposed, which is beneﬁcial in the presence of network externalities.
This result may not hold in our model, however, because we consider network-
speciﬁc preferences. Therefore, like in a monopolistic competition model, the
trade-off between economies of scale and “taste for variety ” should be taken into
account.
Symmetric Competition
If networks are perfectly symmetric, equilibrium prices, in all market structures,
must be equal. Guthrie and Wright (2003) consider some cases of symmetric
competition between payment platforms. They focus solely on the price balance
effect of competition, because they consider either a bank association with ﬁxed
margins on the two market sides, or proprietary schemes subject to Bertrand-like
competition, dissipating proﬁts. This implies that, in their model, total revenue is
constant in all market structures.
In our model, market competition reduces total prices and increases merchant
and consumer welfare. However, the price reduction is not, in general, uniform in
the two sub-markets. To see this, consider the effects of a reduction in merchant
and consumer fees on the other network’s demand volume. Figure 2 provides a
graphical illustration of changes in market sizes generated by a reduction of con-
sumer fee, whereas ﬁgure 3 provides a representation of the effects of a merchant
fee reduction.
When the consumer fee is reduced in a network, the network’s demand ex-
pands because some newcustomersare convincedtochoose this platform. Among
these customers, some were not subscribingto any card before, whereas some oth-
ers are now switching from the other network.
14Figure 2: Market share effects of a reduction in a consumer fee
15Figure 3: Market share effects of a reduction in a merchant fee
16A reduction in a merchant fee, on the other hand, has an indirect effect on the
other network demand. A reduction in the merchant fee affects the merchant’s
demand, which in turn affects the consumer’s demand: m shifts outward. The
area corresponding to the competing network’s market share does not change, but
the density of the consumers in the rectangle decreases.
Because of this “stretching effect” some consumers, previously associated
with points slightly to the left of the 45 degree segment in ﬁgure 3, are now found
to the right of this dividing line, in another market area.15 These consumers are
switching to the alternative network, not because consumer fees are lower there,
but because there is a larger base of accepting merchants.
In a monopolistic two-sided market, a network operator selects prices to bal-
ance the two sides of the market (to get “both sides on board”). Under compe-
tition, the competitive pressure may be different in the two sub-markets, and the
price structure, which emerges in equilibrium, depends on the different market
conditions. In other words, competition does not simply drive the prices down,
but also alters the balance of prices.
In our model, a key factor, determining the relative degree of competition





that is, the factor translating a reduction in f m into an outward shifting of m.
We provide simulations of various equilibria to demonstrate relationships be-
tween different market structures. Table 1 presents parameter values, equilibrium
fees, network proﬁts, consumer and merchant demand, and total transaction vol-
umes for a series of symmetric duopolistic and monopolistic market equilibria.
The ﬁrst four columns give parameter values: customer ﬁxed costs, transaction
costs, upper end of the merchant beneﬁts distribution, upper end of the consumer
beneﬁts distribution. The parameters are not indexed, because they are identical
for both networks. The subsequent four columns give equilibrium values for con-
sumer and merchant fees, their difference, and equilibrium proﬁts. The next three
columns show each network’s demand volume for consumers and merchants and
its total non-cash transactions.
Table 1A shows equilibriumvalues for each ﬁrm under duopolistic Nash com-
petition and table 1B shows equilibrium values of each ﬁrm when the two ﬁrms
15Also, some previous non-subscribers, initially in the smaller lower left rectangle, are moved
rightwardinto the market area.
17operate as a cartel. The results show that for all parameter values the duopolistic
competition results in lower consumer and merchant fees, higher consumer and
merchant demand and a greater number of total transactions.
There are two cases where either the consumer fee or the merchant fee is zero
(or even negative) in the duopolistic market.16 As expected from our previous
discussion, this is a consequence of µ   τ,o rµ   τ, making one side of the
market signiﬁcantly more competitive than the other.
Table 1: Symmetric Competition
A: Duopolistic
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0 0 1 1 .181 .236 -.055 .170 .471 .764 .360
0 0.5 1 1 .248 .449 -.201 .087 .397 .551 .219
0.2 0 1 1 .360 .199 .161 .127 .398 .801 .319
0 0 2 1 0 .666 -.666 .222 .5 .667 .333
0 0 2 1 -.169 .732 -.901 .137 .5 .634 .317
0 0 1 2 .828 0 .828 .343 .414 1 .414
B: Cartel
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0 0 1 1 .376 .248 .128 .211 .375 .752 .282
0 0.5 1 1 .326 .451 -.125 .096 .324 .549 .178
0.2 0 1 1 .474 .202 .272 .141 .324 .798 .259
0 0 2 1 .218 .813 -.595 .302 .433 .594 .257
0 0 1 2 1.155 0 1.155 .385 .333 1 .333
The fee for merchants does not signiﬁcantly change in the two market struc-
tures. However, the fees to consumers changes drastically from the duopoly to
16The fourth and the ﬁfth rows in table 1A show results for the same set of parameter values.
In one case, consumers fee are constrained to be non-negative, whereas in the other case they can
take negative values. There are examples of negative fees in the United States such as cashback
programs. Onthe other hand, equilibriumfees in the cartel case are never negative. Also, itis easy
to see that equilibriummerchant fees cannot be negative in any market structure.
18the cartel. In column 7, we compute the difference between consumer fees and
merchant fees, and we ﬁnd that the difference increases for all parameter values.
The reason why consumers gain relativelymore, in ourexamples, frommarket
competition, is explained in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the symmetric market with uniform and independent distribu-
tions of consumer and merchant beneﬁts, there is more competitive pressure on
the consumer side (higher marginal proﬁts from a fee reduction) if, in the monop-
olistic equilibrium, either the merchant fee is zero, or:
Mfc
Dm ≤ 2µ − τ (13)
Proof. Assume fm
j > 0. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium, suppose that
either fc
j or fm
j are marginally decreased. In both cases, w = mi − fc
i . Using
this value for w in equations 11 and 12, we ﬁnd that the marginal change in the
consumer demand of the competing network, determining the pecuniary external-


















(m − fc)[fc + .5(m − fc)]
m2 (14)
where we dropped subscripts, for notational convenience, and we made use of the
deﬁnition of demand 5 or 6. Condition 13 is obtained from simple manipulations
of 14.
On the contrary, assume fm
j =0 .I n this case, the partial derivative of the con-
sumer demand is discontinuous, because all merchants are already subscribing
both networks, and a further reduction in the merchant fee would not bring about
more merchants and, consequently, more consumers. The networks are therefore
competing on one side only (the consumer one), and only consumer fees can de-
crease. 
Observing that consumer fees cannot be negative in the cartel equilibrium, the
following corollary can be immediately derived:17
17If fc =0for both networks, all consumers subscribe to one network. Lower fees cannot
increase totalconsumer demand or proﬁts. On the other hand, negative fees can be observed in the
competitive duopoly, because of the desire to undercut the competitor.
19Corollary 1 A sufﬁcient condition for the consumer fees falling less than mer-
chant fees under competition, if merchant fees remain strictly positive, is :
τ ≥ 2µ (15)
What is the meaning of τ and µ ? They are both parameters determining the
amplitude of the interval of the (uniform) distribution function of transactional
beneﬁts for consumers (τ) and merchants (µ).
If the support of a distribution function is larger, there is more differentiation
among agents. When τ ≥ 2µ a marginal change in the consumer fee produces
little effects on the consumer demand, but a marginal change in the merchant fee
produces relatively large variations in the merchant demand. As a consequence,
the duopolistic networks compete more vigorously on the merchant sub-market,
and merchant fees decrease relatively more if condition 15 is met.18
In the appendix, we look at the resulting price structures and see that they
are not welfare efﬁcient. Furthermore, although competition improves welfare
because of a reduction in total price, the price structure may actually worsen in
terms of welfare.
Asymmetric Competition
Most real marketsinvolve competitionbetween asymmetric players. Forexample,
debit and credit cards are competing payment instruments, although they differ in
terms of cost structure and services provided to consumers and merchants. Such
competition has been investigated by the courts in the United States and by regu-
lators in other parts of the world. We are not aware of any theoretical models that
have attempted to investigate such competition.
Unfortunately, the analysis of asymmetric competition in the model illustrated
above is very complex, and general analytical results cannot be readily obtained.
Yet, useful insights can be gained through a combination of numerical examples
and a careful inspection of the optimization condition 7, which still hold, in gen-
eral, under asymmetry.
A simple way to address the issue is to start from a symmetric equilibrium
and consider a marginal change in a speciﬁc cost or demand parameter, for one of
the two networks. How will this perturbation of symmetry conditions affect the
market equilibrium? This question can usefully be decomposed into two parts:
(a) how will this change induce different aggregate price levels? (b) how will
18In our numerical examples, this never occurs.
20asymmetric conditions affect the balance between relative prices on the two sides
of the market?
The ﬁrst sub-question has a quite straightforward answer. The model consid-
ered here is reminiscent of an asymmetric Hotelling model, and results are simi-
lar. In an asymmetric Hotelling duopoly, consumers are evenly distributed along
a [0,1] segment, with one ﬁrm located at point 0 and the other one located at point
1+∆. Consumers buy one unit of a good, selecting the ﬁrm associated with the
minimum total cost, which is the sum of producer price and transportation cost.
In this case, it can be easily shown that (under full market coverage) prices ap-
plied by the ﬁrst ﬁrm (and proﬁts) are an increasing function of the parameter ∆,
whereas the opposite occurs for the competitor. Analogously, in our model any
cost increase, or any positive change in consumer/merchant preferences, will in-
duce higher (aggregate) prices by a ﬁrm and a reaction by its competitor, which
lowers its own (aggregate) prices.
In addition, the price balance between the two market sides also changes, be-
cause elasticities in equation 7 vary. Rochet and Tirole (2004) notice that this
effect can be explained in the form of a simple “topsy-turvy principle”: a factor
that is conducive to a high price on one side, to the extent that it raises the plat-
form’s margin on that side, tends also to call for a low price on the other side,
as attracting members on that other side becomes more proﬁtable. Because the
relevant cost concept in a two-sided market is the opportunity cost,a ny time an
additional marginal unit is produced on one side, the network faces a marginal
cost, but it can also raise the price on the other side, as the utility of the other side
agents is increasing.
Coupling this effect with the asymmetric Hotelling one, we can see that any
factor that is conducive to a high price on one side for one network induces: (a)
al o wer price on the other side for the same network, (b) a lower price on the
same side for the other network, (c) a higher price on the other side for the other
network. In other words, the networks follow a “reversed strategy” in terms of
price balancing.
Table 2 presents equilibrium prices and demand volumes under asymmetric
duopolistic competition and collusion, for a variety of parameter values. The
cases could be interpreted as simulating (in a rather simplistic way) competition
between a debit card network (network 2) and a credit card network (network 1).
The latter is assumed to have higher customer costs and to provide more beneﬁts
to consumers (such as credit) and potentially, to merchants.
The effects of competition on the asymmetric market are not qualitatively dif-
ferentfromthe ones obtainedunder symmetry. This should notcome as a surprise,
21as the sign of pecuniary externalities in equations 11 and 12 were derived for the
general case.
Numerical simulations conﬁrm that relative prices, both in competition and in
collusion, move in opposite directions, when parameter values for one network
are changed from the symmetric benchmark. In all circumstances, when fees on
one side of the market are lowered by a network, the other network reacts by low-
ering fees on the opposite market side.
22Table 2: Asymmetric Competition
A. Duopoly
Network 1
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0.1 0 1 1.1 .328 .176 .152 .153 .410 .824 .338
0.1 0.5 1 1.1 .397 .372 .025 .068 .312 .628 .196
0.1 0 1.1 1.1 .285 .235 .050 .158 .427 .786 .336
0.1 0.5 1.1 1.1 .363 .434 -.071 .075 .335 .605 .203
Network 2
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0.0 0 1.0 1.0 .190 .255 -.065 .189 .496 .745 .370
0 0.5 1 1 .249 .461 -.212 .096 .420 .539 .226
0 0 1 1 .188 .250 -.062 .184 .489 .750 .367
0 0.5 1 1 .249 .459 -.210 .093 .412 .541 .223
B. Cartel
Network 1
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0.1 0 1 1.1 .522 .177 .345 .177 .311 .823 .256
0.1 0.5 1 1.1 .474 .371 .103 .071 .244 .629 .153
0.1 0 1.1 1.1 .480 .238 .242 .186 .327 .784 .256
0.1 0.5 1.1 1.1 .442 .432 .010 .080 .266 .607 .162
Network 2
g c µ τ fc fm fc − fm Π Dc Dm DcDm
0.0 0 1.0 1.0 .349 .265 .084 .225 .413 .735 .304
0 0.5 1 1 .307 .464 -.157 .104 .363 .536 .195
0 0 1 1 .356 .261 .095 .221 .403 .739 .298
0 0.5 1 1 .311 .461 -.150 .102 .350 .539 .189
234 Alternative Fee Structures and Assumptions
In this section, we consider alternative fee structures and assumptions and discuss
how our results might be affected.
Reversed Multihoming
Consider the case where merchants pay ﬁxed fees and consumers pay per-transac-
tion fees. In the United States, some banks have started to charge per-transaction
fees for online debit cards. Some observers of payment markets have suggested
that the ﬁxed fees associated with installing personal identiﬁcation number pads
may keep certain merchants from accepting them.
Given that consumers pay ﬁxed fees and can only choose to be a member of
one network, we found that consumers consider the number of merchants that
accept a certain payment product in their decision to purchase payment services
from that network. However, merchants only consider the net beneﬁts of accept-
ing cards for a single transaction because they multihome. Reversing who pays
ﬁxed fees and singlehomes and who pays per-transaction fees and multihomes,
we would expect to see merchants choosing to accept payment cards based on
the number of consumers that carry them and consumers choosing to hold both
payment products because there is no cost in doing so.
In the United States, it is not uncommon to see consumers multihome among
and across payment products. For credit cards, merchant acceptance of Ameri-
can Express and Discover credit cards is less than that of MasterCard and Visa
cards.19 While consumers may prefer the former cards, they may carry the latter
cards as insurance against merchants not accepting the formercards. Interestingly,
mostconsumers multihomewhenit comes tosignature-based andPIN-baseddebit
cards, but merchants have started to reject certain types of debit cards and steer
their customers to using a certain type of debit card.
Nonetheless, the results obtained from our model still hold, if the two market
sides are switched. This can be easily done by re-interpreting all variables and
parameters with a m superscript as referred to the consumers, and all variables
and parameters with a c superscript as referred to the merchants.
19For comparison, we are consideringcharge cards inthis example. A substantialpart of Amer-
ican Express cards are charge cards where consumers are notable to revolve. It is also noteworthy
thatAmerican Expressdominates thecorporatecard marketsuggestingthatthereare indeedstrong
consumer preferences.
24Endogenous Single/Multihoming
In the model presented in this paper, one side adopts a single platform (single-
home) whereas the other one can use more than one platform (multihome). This
conﬁguration can emerge whenever the ﬁxed cost of joining a network is sufﬁ-
ciently high, so that the cost of having a secondary payment instrument outweighs
the potential beneﬁts. This is, for example, the typical case of credit cards in most
European countries, where consumers pay a ﬁxed membership fee and typically
carry only one card.
Ideally, as membership fee is endogenously determined within the model, so
should be the single/multihoming decision. Endogeneizing this choice, however,
can easily make the model analytically intractable. To our knowledge, only one
paper (Hermalin and Katz (2004)) has addressed the issue of bilateral multihom-
ing, through extensive use of numerical simulations.
Furthermore, new issues arise. For example, if both sides have both instru-
ments available, who decides which platform will be used? Can one side refuse
to accept or to adopt one instrument, only to steer the other side to the most pre-
ferred alternative? Clearly, these are all interesting issues, whose investigation
falls, however, outside the scope of this paper.
Bertrand-like Competition
Instead of assuming that beneﬁts are independently drawn for each payment net-
work, consider the opposite polar case of perfect correlation. For example, a con-
sumer may value the possibility of making credit card transactions, irrespective of
the type of card. Yet, cards may be qualitatively differentiated. Basic beneﬁts are
the same for the two payment instruments, although they are consumer-speciﬁc.
This case can be accommodated by assuming that a uniform random variable
x in the interval [0,1] is drawn for each consumer, and basic beneﬁts are obtained
by multiplying this variable by (network-speciﬁc) maximum basic beneﬁts τi .I n
this case:
U

































25we can deﬁne two sets, [0,x] and [x,1], identifying the range of values of x, for
which one network is preferred to the other.20
The market share of a network is given by the intersection of this “prefer-
ence set” and the set deﬁned by equation 17. Of course, this intersection may be
empty. There is one exception: when total maximum beneﬁts and consumer fees
are equal, the two market areas overlap and the consumer is indifferent between
the two cards. In this case, we can assume that the market is equally split.
To understand how prices are set in a symmetric duopolistic equilibrium, start
from arbitrary initial fee levels. On the consumer side, total demand would then
be determined by the viability condition 17. From this point on, a slight reduc-
tion in the consumer fee or, equivalently, in the merchant fee, could allow each
competitor to conquer the whole market (although total demand would change
only marginally). That is, each competitor has an incentive to undercut either by
lowering the consumer fee or by lowering the merchant fee.
The outcome is a special type of Bertrand price war with two instruments
and the equilibrium is found when proﬁts are dissipated. Each network tries to
offer higher net beneﬁts to the subscribing consumers. In equilibrium, consumer
net beneﬁts are maximized, under the constraint of non-negative proﬁt for the
networks.21
This result is a direct consequence of the perfect correlation in the distribution
of consumers’ beneﬁts. In real markets, consumers are likely to have both ‘brand
preferences’ and ‘payment tool preferences,’ irrespective of brand. In terms of
Figure 1, consumers would then be located inside a positively sloped ‘cloud’ of
points, and the marketequilibriumwouldfall somewherein between the twopolar
cases analyzed in this paper (perfect correlation vs. independent distributions of
consumer beneﬁts).
5P olicy Implications
Recently, pricing policies of credit card networks and debit card networks have
been investigated by authorities in various jurisdictions. The apparent barriers to
competition in the payment card industry and its harm to consumers and mer-
20The implicitassumption here is 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Alternative cases are trivial.
21A similar result is found by Guthrie and Wright (2003). In their model, however, consumers
get theirdraw oftransactional beneﬁts after having subscribeda card. This implies thatconsumers
are ex-ante equal, when making a subscription decision. However, Guthrie and Wright do not
consider positive subscriptionfees.
26chants has been the basis for investigations by the Reserve Bank of Australia, the
U.S. courts along with authorities in other jurisdictions.22 However, few academic
models address the issue of platform competition in the provision of payment ser-
vices. As far as we aware, we are the ﬁrst to consider competition among dif-
ferentiated payment products being supplied by a single network or different net-
works. Our modelling strategy is justiﬁed by the coexistence of multiple payment
networks that may serve various niche markets for a given payment instrument
and/or supply multiple payment instruments.
In this paper, we address the effect of competing payment networks on con-
sumer and merchant welfare. We ﬁnd that competition unambiguously increases
consumer and merchant welfare suggesting that policymakers should promote
competition among networks providing similar products and those offeringdiffer-
ent products. Within a payment type such as credit cards, debit cards, or checks,
providers offer various differentiated products. Our results suggest that not only
are there beneﬁts to competition within a payment type but also across payment
types. Thus, when determining policies regarding payment networks, competitive
pressures from similar and different payment products should be considered.
Fora ne xample of the effects of competition on price level, we look to the
entry of credit cards in the U.S. grocery store market. In certain market segments,
such as grocery stores in the United States, the acceptance of lower cost alter-
natives such as PIN-based debit cards resulted in lower merchant discounts for
MasterCard and Visa branded credit cards.23 During the same time, there were no
noticeable differenceson the consumer side. In fact, certain card issuers are offer-
ing additional beneﬁts to those cardholders that make purchases at grocery stores.
To isolate the effect of competition on price structure is a bit more difﬁcult. How-
ever, with the recent interchange fee regulation in Australia, some industry reports
suggest that consumer beneﬁts such as frequent-use enhancements will decrease
because of lower interchange fees. Given that regulatory changes only recently
took place, it is too early to tell the effect on the total volume of transactions.
We ignore some beneﬁts of a single platform providing payment services or
cooperation between payment networks. Payment services most likely exhibit
22Foradiscussion of competition among payment instruments, see Reserve Bank of Australia
2002. For a discussion of the recently settled merchant lawsuit against MasterCard and Visa, see
Chakravorti (2003).
23Note that the beneﬁts to grocers from credit cards may be less than other types of merchants.
Some analysts have argued that some consumers may be reluctant to make food and other “neces-
sary” good purchases on credit. For more details, see McAndrews and Stefanadis (1999).
27economies of scale and scope.24 However, as noted above, consumers and mer-
chants may have strong preferences for product differentiation resulting in poten-
tially restrictingscale economies. Some economists have argued that certain types
governance structures may limit monopoly rents. Hausman, Leonard, and Tirole
(2003) suggest that if the payment platforms are not-for-proﬁtentities and are not
allowed to share proﬁts with members, cooperationamong the networks may limit
the rents that could be earned. We leave these issues for future research.
6 Conclusion
To date most theoretical models consider a single platform with varying levels of
competition among network participants. Few theoretical models have considered
competing payment platforms. Unlike previous models, we consider network-
speciﬁc beneﬁts for consumers and merchants. We investigate the impact of com-
peting payment networkson consumer and merchantwelfare, networkproﬁts, and
the ratio of consumer and merchant prices. We ﬁnd that competition always im-
proves consumer and merchant welfare. As expected, network proﬁts decrease
with competition. The ratio of consumer and merchant prices depend on the dif-
ferences in the beneﬁts.
However, we ignore some aspects of the payment industry captured by others.
Most notably, we ignore strategic reasons for merchants to accept other payment
products. Guthrie and Wright (2003) consider intratemporal business stealing as a
motivation for merchants to accept payment cards. Business stealing would affect
the level of merchant fees. However, the aggregate welfare of merchants does not
improve with business stealing because net sales presumably remain constant. In
fact, Chakravorti and To (2003) suggest that intertemporal business stealing may
decrease merchant welfare under certain conditions.
In reality, consumers and merchants both multihome to some extent. Unfor-
tunately, there are difﬁculties in modeling an environment where consumers and
merchants both multihome in the presence of ﬁxed fees. In markets such as the
U.S. where consumers carry several payment products, consumers may still pre-
fer to use one payment instrument for most transactions. Alternatively, consumers
may have preferences for one payment instrument based on the value and type of
the transaction. Therefore, consumers may carry more than one card as insurance
24For discussion of scale and scope economies in payment services, see Chakravorti and Kobor
(2003).
28when one card is not accepted by the merchant or for some technical reason does
not function. The underlying reasons why consumers multihome has not been
modelled and remains a future direction of research.
In this paper, we extend the literature on payment networks that sheds light
on the effects of competition on consumer and merchant welfare by considering
a speciﬁcl evelo fbeneﬁts for each consumer and merchant for each network’s
payment services. We ﬁnd threshhold values when competition affects consumer
prices or merchantprices more. While there are theoreticalmodels that investigate
network competition, these models have not been empirically tested. This type of
empirical research is vital for policymakers to adopt the optimal polices regarding
payment networks.
29References
Ahlborn, Christian, Howard H. Chang, and David S. Evans (2001), “The Problem
of Interchange Fee Analysis: Case Without a Cause,” European Competition Law
Review, 22, 304-312.
Armstrong, Mark (2004), “Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Mimeo, pre-
sented at “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets” conference held at the Uni-
versity of Toulouse.
Balto, David A. (2000) “The Problem of Interchange Fees: Costs without Bene-
ﬁts,” European Competition Law Review, 21, 215-224.
Baxter, William F. (1983), “Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and
Economic Perspectives,” Journal of Law & Economics, 26, 541-588.
Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2001), “Chicken & Egg: Competing Match-
makers,” Mimeo.
Caillaud, Bernard and Bruno Jullien (2003), “Chicken & Egg: Competition
among Intermediation Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics, 24, 309-
328.
Chakravorti, Sujit (2003), “Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the
Literature,” Review of Network Economics, 2, 50-68.
Chakravorti, Sujit and William R. Emmons (2003), “Who Pays for Credit Cards?”
Journal of Consumer Affairs, 37, 208-230.
Chakravorti, Sujit and Emery Kobor (2003), “Why Invest in Payment Innova-
tions,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Emerging Payments Occasional Paper
Series, No1B.
Chakravorti, Sujit and Timothy McHugh (2002), “Why Do We Write so Many
Checks?” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, Third Quar-
ter, 44-59.
Chakravorti, Sujit and Alpa Shah (2003), “The Study of the Interrelated Bilateral
Transactions in Credit Card Networks,” The Antitrust Bulletin, Spring, 53-75.
30Chakravorti, Sujit and Ted To (2003), “A Theory of Credit Cards,” Mimeo, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Cruickshank, Don (2000), Competition in UK Banking: Report to the Chancellor
of the Exchequer.
European Commission (2002), “Case No. Comp/29.373 - Visa International -
Multilateral Interchange Fee,” Ofﬁcial Journal of the European Communities,
2002/L318/17, November 22.
Evans, David S. (2003), “Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided PlatformIndus-
tries,” Review of Network Economics, 2 (3), 191-209.
Farrell, Joseph and Garth Saloner (1985), “Standardization, Compatibility and
Innovation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 16, 70-83.
Frankel, Alan S. (1998), “Monopoly and Competitionin the Supplyand Exchange
of Money,” Antitrust Law Journal, 66, 311-361.
Gans, Joshua S. and Stephen P. King (2003), “The Neutrality of the Interchange
Fees in the Payment System,” Topics in Economic Analysis & Politics, 3, article 1
located at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol3/iss1/art1.
Guthrie, Graeme and Julian Wright (2003), “Competing Payment Schemes,”
Working Paper No. 0311, Department of Economics, National University of Sin-
gapore.
Hausman, Jerry A., Gregory K. Leonard, Jean Tirole (2003), “On Nonexclusive
Membership in Competing Joint Ventures,” Rand Journal of Economics, 34, 43-
62.
Hermalin, B.E., and Katz, M.L., (2004), “YourNetwork or Mine? The Economics
of Routing Rules,” presented at “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets” confer-
ence held at the University of Toulouse, January.
IMA Market Development AB (2000), Study Regarding the Effects of the Aboli-
tion of the Non-Discrimination Rule in Sweden, IMA Market Development AB:
Lerum, Sweden.
Little, Ian and Julian Wright, (2000), “Peering and Settlement in the Internet: an
Economic Analysis,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 18, 151-173.
31Jullien, Bruno (2001), “Competing in Network Industries: Divide and Conquer,”
Mimeo, IDEI and GREMAQ, University of Toulouse.
Katz, Michael L. (2001), Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia II, Sydney,
Australia: Reserve Bank of Australia.
Katz, Michael L. and Carl Shapiro (1985), “Network Externalities, Competition,
and Compatibility,” American Economic Review, 75, 424-440.
McAndrews, James J. and Chris Stefanadis (1999), “The Issues of Exclusivity and
Overlapping Governance in the Visa and MasterCard Antitrust Case,” Mimeo,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Reserve Bank of Australia (2002), Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia
IV: Final Reforms and Regulation Impact Statement, Sydney, Australia: Reserve
Bank of Australia.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole (2002), “Cooperation among Competitors:
The Economics of Payment Card Associations,” Rand Journal of Economics, 33,
549-570.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole (2003), “Platform Competition in Two-
Sided Markets,” Journal of European Economic Association, 1, 990-1029.
Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole (2004), “Two-Sided Markets: An
Overview,” mimeo, IDEI University of Toulouse. A preliminary version was pre-
sented at “The Economics of Two-Sided Markets” conference, held at the Univer-
sity of Toulouse, January.
Roson, Roberto (2003), “Incentives for the Expansion of Network Capacity in a
Peering Free Access Settlement” Netnomics, 5, 149-159.
Schiff, Aaron (2003), “Open and Closed Systems of Two-Sided Networks,” Infor-
mation Economics and Policy, 15, 425-442.
Schmalensee, Richard (2002), “Payment Systems and Interchange Fees,” Journal
of Industrial Economics, 50, 103-122.
Schwartz, Marius and Daniel R. Vincent (2002), “Same Price, Cash or Card:
Vertical Control by Payments Networks,” Mimeo, University of Maryland.
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (2001) 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (S.D. N.Y.).
32Vis, E. and J. Toth (2000), The Abolition of the No-Discrimination Rule, ITM
Research for Competition DG: Amsterdam.
Wright, Julian (2003), “Optimal Card Payment Systems,” European Economic
Review, 47, 587-612.
Wright, Julian (2004), “The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Pay-
ment Systems,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 52, 1-26.
337A ppendix:
Sub-optimal Price Structures in Duopoly
In the paper, we showed that network competition unambiguously reduces equi-
libriumprices, and increases the numberofsubscribing merchantsand consumers,
as well as their welfare. However, neither monopoly nor competitive price struc-
tures are welfare-efﬁcient. Furthermore, the introduction of market competition
may not bring about better price structures, in terms of aggregate welfare of con-
sumers and merchants. We show this for the symmetric case, using parameter







Keeping the proﬁtl evel ﬁxed, a marginal change in the consumer fee would




Thus, we ask the following question: starting from any of the equilibria re-
ported in Table 1, would it be possible to get a higher aggregate welfare for con-
sumers and merchants, for the same level of platform proﬁts?
To answer, we need ﬁrst to identify the consumer and merchant welfare in
the symmetric equilibria. For each single platform, aggregate consumer welfare








































To assess the welfare impact of a proﬁt-neutral price rebalancing between the
















Therefore, a positive η means that it would be possible to get a higher aggre-
gate welfare (consumer welfare + merchant welfare), by slightly augmenting fc,
while reducing fm so as to keep proﬁts unchanged. The computation of η for
parameter values and prices of Table 1 gives the following results for duopolistic
competition (C) and monopolistic cartel (M):
g c µ τ η-C η-M
0 0 1 1 0.361 0.255
0 0.5 1 1 0.278 0.256
0.2 0 1 1 0.265 0.221
0 0 2 1 0.417 0.130
0 0 1 2 0.564 0.522
Notice that: (1) the η index is always positive, meaning that consumer fees are
“too low”, and (2) introducing competition actually worsens the price structure.
This is, of course, a direct consequence of the consumer fees falling relatively
more in the competitive regime.
Summing up, market competition implies a downward pressure on prices, as-
sociated with a change in the price structure. The ﬁrst effect is welfare-improving,
whereas the second one may have negative welfare consequences. In our setting,
the ﬁrst effect dominates the second one, so that welfare of both consumers and
merchants improves in any case.27
26Remember that, to keep proﬁts unchanged, an increase (decrease) in fm must be associated
with a proportionaldecrease (increase) in fc,b yafactor Dm.
27However, ifwechoosea differentstartingpoint,likeaprice-constrainedmonopoly,thesecond
effect may be determinant, and competitionmay actually reduce welfare.
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